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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
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)
)
)
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)

)
STEVEN KENNETH BOWMAN, )
)
Defendant-Appellant
)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REVIEW

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Steven Bowman asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review the opinion of the
Idaho Court of Appeals, 2015 Unpublished Opinion No. 41813 (Ct App. Sept 3, 2015)

(hereinafter, Opinion). He submits that the Opinion, which affirmed the order partially
denying his motion to suppress, is in conflict with recent United States Supreme Court
precedent, Rodriguez v. United States, _

U.S. _ , 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015).

It is

particularly troubling that the Court of Appeals does not mention, much less analyze,
this new decision regarding whether the dog sniff illegally prolonged the detention of
Mr. Bowman, as the new decision rejects the analysis used in the Opinion.
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Idaho Supreme Court and United States

The Opinion is also in conflict

analysis of the fruit of the poisonous tree

Court precedent in regard

Rather than apply the standard articulated in precedent - that evidence
should be suppressed as poisonous fruit if it was found "by exploitation of" the illegal
search and not sufficiently distinguishable therefrom - the Court of Appeals improperly
applied the stricter "but for" standard, thereby requiring Mr. Bowman to prove, but for
the illegality, officers would not have found the evidence in the car.

In so holding, it

Precedent is clear that the defendant only

improperly reversed the burdens of proof.

need establish a factual nexus between the illegal action and the evidence to be
suppressed, at which point, the State must prove the evidence was not tainted.
For all those reasons, this Court should grant review in this case. On review, it
should reverse the order insofar as it denied Mr. Bowman's motion to suppress, vacate
the judgment of conviction, and remand this case for further proceedings.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Brant Casey called police dispatch to report witnessing an ongoing domestic
battery between the two people in the car in front of him. (Tr., Vol.1, p.10, L.2 - p.12,
L.10; Tr., Vol.1, p.15, Ls.16-18.) 1

Specifically, Mr. Casey reported that the female

passenger in the car had hit the male driver in the head. (Tr., Vol.1, p.10, Ls.5-6.) The
driver responded defensively by pushing the passenger away from himself with his hand
on her neck. (Tr., Vol.1, p.17, Ls.4-14.) The passenger continued to sporadically hit the

The transcripts in this case are contained in two independently bound and paginated
volumes. To avoid confusion, "Vol.1" will refer to the volume containing the transcript
from the hearing on Mr. Bowman's motion to suppress, held on September 18, 2013.
"Vol.2" will refer to the volume containing the transcripts of the change of plea hearing
held on November 22, 2013, and the sentencing hearing held on January 3, 2014.
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driver, and he tried to defend himself, but, with his attention thus divided, the car
swerved into other lanes of traffic, including a bicycle lane. (Tr., VoL 1, p.11,

- p.12,

Mr. Casey continued to follow the car, relaying his observations to dispatch.
(Tr., Vol.1, p.12, Ls.14-16.)

Mr. Casey did not report seeing any weapons, and,

according to his subsequent testimony, had he seen such items, he would have
informed dispatch. (Tr., Vol.1, p.16, Ls.5-19.)
Three Garden City police officers, Tyler Domeny, James O'Gorman, and
Sergeant Jerry Walbey, responded to Mr. Casey's call.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.20, Ls.15-20.)

Dispatch informed the officers that Mr. Bowman was the registered owner of the
suspect vehicle.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.42, Ls.10-11; Exhibit 1, Video 1, approximately 0:11.) 2

The suspect vehicle yielded when the officers arrived.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.42, Ls.1-7.)

Mr. Casey also pulled over, and Sergeant Walbey met with him.
Ls.4-8.)

(Tr., Vol.1, p.80,

Meanwhile, Officer Domeny approached the driver, who turned out to be

Mr. Bowman, and ordered him out of the car.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.21, Ls.12-15.)

Officer

Domeny looked for, but did not see, any indications of weapons during this initial
encounter.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.44, Ls.1-6.)

Mr. Bowman got out of the car, and Officer

Domeny immediately placed him in handcuffs, telling him that he was being detained,
but not arrested. (Tr., Vol.1, p.21, Ls.12-15.)

Exhibit 1 was introduced during the hearing on Mr. Bowman's motion to suppress.
It consists of two video clips recorded from Officer Domeny's dashboard camera. The
first video shows the traffic stop and initial encounter with Mr. Bowman. The second
video shows part of Officer O'Gorman's search of Mr. Bowman's pocket. As such,
references to that exhibit will identify the relevant video clip, and, if possible, will identify
the relevant period of the recording.
2
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After securing Mr. Bowman, Officer Domeny asked if he had any weapons on
, and Mr. Bowman responded that

not. (Tr., Vol.1, p.23, L.23 - p.24, L.2.)

Officer Domeny asked if Mr. Bowman "Mind if I check?"

(Exhibit 1, Video 1,

approximately 2:29; see Tr., Vol.1, p.24, L.4 (Officer Domeny testifying he asked
permission to check for weapons.) Mr. Bowman responded "Yeah." 3 (Exhibit 1, Video
1, approximately 2:29; but see Tr., Vol.1, p.48, L.8 (Officer Domeny testifying that
Mr. Bowman told him, "Go ahead").) At about the same time Mr. Bowman answered,
Officer Domeny began to pat down Mr. Bowman.
Exhibit 1, Video 1, approximately 2:29.)
during that search.

Officer Domeny did not find any weapons

(Tr., Vol.1, p.59, Ls.10-11.)

handcuffs from Mr. Bowman.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.47, L.22 - p.48, L.8;

However, he did not remove the

(See generally Exhibit 1, Video 1.)

Instead, Officer

Domeny read Mr. Bowman his rights pursuant to Miranda, 4 and asked him about the
reported domestic battery. (Tr., Vol.1, p.23, Ls.15-18.)
After that discussion with Mr. Bowman, Officer Domeny returned to his car to run
Mr. Bowman's information for potential warrants. (Tr., Vol 1, p.24, Ls.6-18.) As he was
doing that, Officer O'Gorman came to the window to talk with him. 5 (Tr., Vol.1, p.24,
Ls.24-25.) At that time, Officer Domeny turned off his dashboard camera. (Tr., Vol.1,

Mr. Bowman subsequently filed an affidavit asserting this response meant, "Yeah, I do
mind if you check." (See R., p.106.)
4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5 Officer O'Gorman had initially engaged the passenger, Angela Phillips (also referred to
as "Angela Turner" in some portions of the record). Officer O'Gorman had her get out of
the car, placed her in handcuffs, and subjected her to a partial pat down search.
(Tr., Vol.1, p.64, Ls.3-13; Tr., Vol.1, p.75, Ls.9-13 (explaining that he only patted down
the pockets at Ms. Phillips' waist, but not her torso).) After completing that pat down
search, he placed Ms. Phillips, still in handcuffs, in the back of his police vehicle.
(Tr., Vol.1, p.64, Ls.11-13.) Later, he went back and discussed the reported domestic
battery and got her side of the story. (Tr., Vol.1, p.66, Ls.1-3.)
3

4

p.24, L.23 - p.25, L.1.) While the camera was off, both officers testified that they saw
Bowman attempting to get his hands into his right pants pocket. (Tr., Vol.1, p.25,
Tr., p.68, Ls.18-25.)

Officer O'Gorman went over and asked what he was

trying to reach, and Mr. Bowman responded that he was trying to get a cigarette.
(Tr., Vol. 1, p.69, Ls.5-7.)

Officer O'Gorman proceeded to pat the pocket and felt an

item consistent with a pack of cigarettes and did not feel anything indicative of a
weapon. (Tr., Vol.1, p.75, L.17 - p.76, L.5.) Nevertheless, Officer O'Gorman reached
into Mr. Bowman's pocket. (Tr., Vol.1, p.69, L.20.) He pulled out a pack of cigarettes
and a baggie with a crystalline substance, which was subsequently field tested and
identified as presumptively positive for methamphetamine. 6 (Tr., Vol.1, p.69, Ls.20-24;
Tr., Vol.1, p.26, Ls.19-24.)

Upon finding the baggie, Officer O'Gorman placed

Mr. Bowman under arrest for possession of a controlled substance and put him in the
back of Officer Domeny's vehicle. (Tr., Vol.1, p.27, Ls.1-3.) At that point, Mr. Bowman
invoked his right to an attorney.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.54, Ls. 10-17.)

As such, no further

questions were asked of him. (Tr. Vol. 1, p.54, Ls.16-25.)
Around that same time, Sergeant Walbey finished his conversation with
Mr. Casey (the reporting witness) and joined the other officers.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.27,

Ls.5-9.) They discussed what they had each learned in their interviews of the three
people involved and decided what course of action they were going to take in regard to
the domestic violence investigation.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.55, Ls.18-21.)

Specifically, they

decided to arrest Ms. Phillips for misdemeanor domestic battery, which they did.

Part of the way through Officer O'Gorman's search of Mr. Bowman's pocket, Officer
Domeny reactivated his dashboard camera. (See Exhibit 1, Video 2.)
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(Tr., Vol.1, p.66, Ls.15-24.) Officer Domeny testified that, after they made that decision,
considered the investigation of the domestic violence report complete. (Tr., Vol 1,
p.55, Ls.16-21.)
Officers Domeny and O'Gorman also informed Sergeant Walbey that they had
found methamphetamine in Mr. Bowman's pocket, and so, asked him to have his drug
dog, Bullet, sniff Mr. Bowman's car. (Tr., Vol.1, p.27, Ls.5-9.) Sergeant Walbey did so,
and Bullet alerted on the car.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.84, L.22 - p.85, L.18.)

Officer Domeny

proceeded to search the car. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.28, L.14.) During that search, he found a
locked safe, which he pried open. (Tr., Vol.1, p.28, L.20 - p.29, L.13.) Inside, he found
several baggies (two purportedly containing methamphetamine), a digital scale with
some residue on it, and several hundred dollars in cash. (Tr., Vol.1, p.29, L.22 - p.30,
L.6.)
The State ultimately charged Mr. Bowman with possession of a controlled
substance with intent to deliver, misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, and a
persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp.63-64, 110-12.) It consolidated Mr. Bowman's
case with the case against Ms. Phillips.7 ( See R., pp.12, 124.) Mr. Bowman filed a
motion to suppress all the evidence in this case. (R., p.92.) Ms. Phillips joined in that
motion. (See R., p.124.)
The district court granted the motion in part and denied the motion in part.
Specifically, it found that the State had failed to prove that Officer O'Gorman's search of
Mr. Bowman's pocket fell within any of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, and

Officer Domeny had also found a backpack in the car, which had some used
hypodermic needles and Ms. Phillips' identification in it. (Tr., Vol.1, p.30, Ls.14-20.)

7
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it suppressed the baggie found in Mr. Bowman's pocket. 8

However, it concluded that the taint

(R., pp.129-31.)

Officer O'Gorman's unlawful search

of

Mr. Bowman did not require the suppression of the evidence found in the car.
(R., p.132.)

Rather, it concluded that the sniff was sufficiently distinct from Officer

O'Gorman's search of Mr. Bowman's pocket. (R., p.132.) The district court also found
that the detention of Mr. Bowman was not unlawfully prolonged based on its
determination that, while Bullet sniffed the car, Officer O'Gorman went back to ask
Mr. Bowman some more questions and that purported conversation was relevant to the
domestic violence investigation. (R., p.133.)
Mr. Bowman ultimately entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to a plea
agreement.

He agreed to plead guilty to possession with intent to deliver, and he

reserved his right to challenge the order denying the motion to suppress. (Tr., Vol.2,
p.12, Ls.15.17.) In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the paraphernalia charge and
the

persistent

violator

recommendations.

enhancement,

and

(Tr., Vol.2, p.12, Ls.6-15.)

also,

to

make

certain

sentencing

The district court imposed a unified

sentence of fifteen years, with two and one-half years fixed, concurrent to another
sentence Mr. Bowman had been ordered to serve.
R., pp.148-50.)

(Tr., Vol.2, p.50, Ls.16-25;

Mr. Bowman filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment of

conviction. (R., pp.153-55.)
On appeal, he argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress because the use of the drug dog unlawfully prolonged his detention and
because the use of the drug dog was exploiting Officer O'Gorman's unlawful search of

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision to suppress the baggie from
Mr. Bowman's pocket. (Opinion, p.3 n.3.)

8
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Mr. Bowman's pockets.

The Court of Appeals affirmed

As to the first argument, it

determined that Officer O'Gorman was still speaking to Mr. Bowman while the dog sniff
was conducted, and that conversation was necessary to let Mr. Bowman know the
result of the investigation into the report of domestic battery. (Opinion, p.5.) Thus, it
concluded that conversation was part of the domestic battery investigation, and so, held
the dog sniff could occur while Officer O'Gorman was talking with Mr. Bowman.
(Opinion, p.5.) As to the second argument, it concluded that "[Mr.] Bowman failed to
establish a 'but for' connection relating the discovery of the methamphetamine to the
deployment of the drug dog." (Opinion. p.5.) Therefore, it held the search of the car,
conducted pursuant to the dog's positive alert, was lawful (Opinion, p.6.)
Mr. Bowman filed a timely petition for review from the Court of Appeals' Opinion.

8

ISSUES
1

Whether the Court of Appeals' Opinion affirming the order partially denying
Mr. Bowman's motion to suppress is in conflict with decisions of the Idaho
Supreme Court and United States Supreme Court.

2

Whether the district court erred by denying Mr. Bowman's motion to suppress the
evidence found in the car.

9

ARGUMENT
I.

The Court Of Appeals' Opinion Affirming The Order Partially Denying Mr. Bowman's
Motion To Suppress Is In Conflict With Decisions Of The Idaho Supreme Court And
United States Supreme Court

A

Standard For Evaluating Petitions For Review
The Idaho Appellate Rules provide that petitions for review may be granted

only "when there are special and important reasons" for doing so but, ultimately, the
decision of whether to grant a given petition lies within the sound discretion of the
Supreme Court. I.AR. 118(b). This exercise of discretion is not completely unfettered.
Rule 118(b) provides some factors which must be considered in evaluating any petition
for review, including whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with
precedent from the Idaho Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court.

I.AR. 118(b)(2). Mr. Bowman contends that is the case in the Opinion here, and so,
there are special and important reasons for review to be granted. Therefore, this Court
should exercise its review authority in this case.

B.

The Court Of Appeals' Opinion Is Inconsistent With United States Supreme Court
Precedent Regarding Whether The Dog Sniff Unlawfully Prolonged The Stop
The Court of Appeals held that there was sufficient evidence to support the

determination that, while Officer O'Gorman was talking to Mr. Bowman after the officers
had convened to discuss their conclusions regarding the domestic battery investigation,
Sergeant Walbey deployed Bullet to sniff Mr. Bowman's car. (Opinion, p.5.) It held that
Officer O'Gorman was continuing the investigation at that time because he "need[ed] to
make contact with [Mr.] Bowman to conclude the investigation of the domestic battery,

10

lest he [Mr. Bowman] be left in the dark." (Opinion, p.5.) However, the Opinion does
mention the recent decision from the United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez.
is important because, in Rodriguez, the Supreme Court rejected the sort of
analysis the Court of Appeals used in this case. Instead, it held, "[t]he critical question
then, is not whether the dog sniff occurs before the officer issues a ticket
whether

conducting

the

sniff

'prolongs'-i.e.,

adds

time

to-'the

.. but
stop[.]"'

Rodriguez v. United States,_ U.S._, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1616 (2015). That means,
regardless of Officer O'Gorman's need to explain their decision to Mr. Bowman, the dog
sniff still prolonged the detention and was unlawful.
The reason for the Supreme Court's ruling was based on the principle that,
"[b]ecause addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may 'last no longer
than is necessary to effectuate th[at] purpose.' Authority for the seizure thus ends when
tasks tied to the infraction are-or reasonably should have been-completed."

Id.

(quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion)). The Court also
defined what the purpose of the stop entails: "Beyond determining whether to issue a
traffic ticket an officer's mission includes 'ordinary inquires incident to [the traffic] stop."'

Id. at 1615 (emphasis added). Those inquiries include "checking the driver's license,
determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting
the automobile's registration and proof of insurance." Id. A dog sniff is not part of that
purpose.

Id. Additionally, the reasonable time to complete the stop is governed "by

noting what the officer actually did and how he did it[.]" Id. at 1616. The officers are not
allowed to "extend an otherwise-competed traffic stop, absent reasonable suspicion, in
order to conduct a dog sniff." See id. at 1614, 1616. Therefore, the Court held, "[a]s we

11

said in Caballes[ 9 ] and reiterate today, a traffic stop 'prolonged beyond' that point
[where the purpose of the stop is complete] is 'unlawful.' Id.
Thus, the Rodriguez decision reveals that the officer's purpose during a stop is to
determine "whether to issue a [citation]," and prolonging the detention beyond that point
is unlawful.

Id; see, e.g., State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 652 (Ct App. 2002)

(holding that prolonging a detention for even sixty to ninety seconds was unlawful).

In

this case, it is clear when the officers determined they would not issue a citation or
arrest Mr. Bowman for domestic battery. (Tr., Vol.1, p.55, L.16 - p.56, L.4) It is equally
clear that the dog sniff occurred after that decision. They had also already conducted
the inquires associated with that purpose, as they had checked the validity of
Mr. Bowman's license and registration and checked for warrants for his arrest before
Officer O'Gorman's unlawful search.

( See Tr., Vol.1, p.24, Ls.6-18 (the check of

Mr. Bowman's license for warrants); Tr., Vo!.1, p.42, Ls.10-11 (indicating the officers
received a report on the car's registration as they initiated the stop).) Thus, the purpose
of the stop, as defined by the United States Supreme Court, was complete at that point.
Since the officers did not release the car to Mr. Bowman at that time, but rather,
continued detain him so the dog could sniff the car, the dog sniff unlawfully prolonged
the detention. Therefore, even though Officer O'Gorman was explaining their decision
to Mr. Bowman, that explanation was not necessary for the officers to complete the
purpose of the stop (decide whether to cite/arrest Mr. Bowman or Ms. Phillips for

9

Illinois

v.

Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005).

12

domestic battery), and therefore, continuing to detain Mr, Bowman at that time to allow
dog to sniff the car was unlawful per Rodriguez. 10
At any rate, the United States Supreme Court has held that officers cannot draw
out the purpose of the stop to let a dog sniff happen. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614-15,
Caballes, 543, U.S. at 407. Thus, if a dog sniff extends beyond the time reasonably

necessary for the officer to complete the purpose of the stop, the sniff still unlawfully
prolongs the detention. Id. Therefore, even if Officer O'Gorman's explanation was part
of the purpose of the stop, the dog sniff still prolonged the detention because the time
reasonably needed for Officer O'Gorman to give that explanation was not as long as the
time it took Sergeant Walbey to get Bullet out of the car and have him sniff the car.
All Officer O'Gorman had to tell Mr. Bowman was Ms. Phillips is being arrested
for domestic battery and unlock his handcuffs. However, Sergeant Walbey still had to
return to his car and get Bullet. (Tr., Vol.1, p.82, L.2.) Then, he had to take Bullet to
Mr. Bowman's car. (Tr., Vol.1, p.82, L.3.) Then, he had Bullet start sniffing at the front
grill of the car.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.82, Ls.3-4.) Then, they started walking around the car.

At some level, this whole discussion requires a hypothetical extrapolation of fact. The
officers believed they had reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of their
investigation based on the drugs Officer O'Gorman found in Mr. Bowman's pocket.
(See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.26, L.14 - p.27, L.9 (Officer Domeny testifying that he placed
Mr. Bowman under arrest before the dog sniff occurred based on the fruits of Officer
O'Gorman's search of Mr. Bowman's pockets).) Thus, in actuality, the officers were not
going to unlock the handcuffs and let Mr. Bowman leave when they finished
investigating the domestic battery. However, since the search of Mr. Bowman's pocket
was unlawful (see Section 11(0), infra), the only valid basis for the officers to have
detained Mr. Bowman at all was the initial report of domestic battery. Therefore, the
entire discussion of this legal principle is based on the hypothetical fact that, considering
only the investigation of the reported domestic battery, the officers would have moved to
let Mr. Bowman go immediately after ending their investigation of the domestic battery.
This factual extrapolation also demonstrates why Officer O'Gorman's illegal search
tainted the dog sniff, and so, the evidence found pursuant to the dog sniff should have
been suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree of Officer O'Gorman's search.
10
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, Vol.1, p.84, Ls.3-6.) Then, Bullet stopped to sniff at the passenger door and tried
to get inside the car. (Tr., Vol.1, p.82, Ls.

3.) Only once Bullet had gotten inside the

passenger door and sniffed under the passenger seat did he alert. (Tr., Vol.1, p.82,
Ls.13-15.) Given Sergeant Walbey's explanation of the dog sniff, that procedure took
him five to ten minutes to complete. (See R., p.127.)
However, it would not reasonably take Officer O'Gorman, who had sixteen years'
experience in law enforcement (Tr., Vol.1, p.62, L.20 - p.63, L.3), five to ten minutes to
unlock the handcuffs and give a sufficient explanation to Mr. Bowman. Therefore, even
if the time reasonably needed to unlock the handcuffs and explain the decision is
considered part of the investigation (which raises a whole different issue, unaddressed
by the Court of Appeals, because that would mean Officer O'Gorman reinitiated contact
with Mr. Bowman to continue investigating this offense after Mr. Bowman had invoked
his right to an attorney), the dog sniff continued beyond the time reasonably needed to
unlock the handcuffs and explain the decision.
Therefore, given the rules articulated by the United States Supreme Court in
Rodriguez, the use of the drug dog in this case prolonged the otherwise-completed

traffic stop.

That means the dog sniff was unlawful.

Thus, the Court of Appeals'

Opinion, which does not even mention Rodriguez, is inconsistent with that United States
Supreme Court precedent. As such, this Court should grant review in this case and
ensure Idaho case law stays consistent with the mandates of the United States
Supreme Court.

14

C.

The Court Of Appeals' Opinion Is Inconsistent With United States And Idaho
Supreme Court Precedent Regarding The Application Of The Fruit Of The
Poisonous Tree Doctrine
The Court of Appeals decided that the evidence found in the car was not fruit of

the poisonous tree resulting from Officer O'Gorman's unlawful search of Mr. Bowman's
pockets because "[Mr.] Bowman failed to establish a 'but for' connection relating the
discovery of the methamphetamine to the deployment of the drug dog " (Opinion, p.5.)
However, both the Idaho and Untied States Supreme Courts have stated that the test
under the poisonous fruit doctrine is not a "but for" test, but rather, is an examination of
whether the evidence objected to "has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or
instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint."
State v. Radford, 134 Idaho 187, 193 (2000) (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963)).

Thus, the Court of Appeals applied the wrong standard,

which means its Opinion is contrary to the established, controlling precedent.
Furthermore, once the defendant establishes a factual nexus between the
evidence to be suppressed and the illegal police conduct, it is the State, not the
defense, which bears the burden of proving that the evidence in question has not been
tainted by the unlawful search.

State v. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245, 250 (1990).

Therefore, by requiring Mr. Bowman to prove the error in this regard, the Court of
Appeals' Opinion improperly reversed the burdens on this issue, further demonstrating
why this Court should exercise its review authority in this case.
Finally, as discussed in greater depth in Section ll(D), infra, the search of the car
was not sufficiently distinct from the unlawful search of Mr. Bowman's pocket. In fact,
Sergeant Walbey testified the decision to have Bullet sniff the car was based on what

15

Officer O'Gorman discovered during his (unlawful) search. "They [Officers Domeny and
O'Gorman] had also communicated [to Sergeant Walbey] that they had found what they
believed to be methamphetamine on [Mr. Bowman]. And, at that point, we decided we
would use my dog to sniff the exterior of the vehicle." (Tr., Vol.1, p.81, Ls.19-23; see
also Tr., Vol.1, p.27, Ls.5-9 (Officer Domeny corroborating that account of the decision

to use the drug dog).) Since the dog sniff was the only potential legitimate source of
probable cause to search the car (see Opinion, p.6), the search of the car is tainted by
the dog sniff, which itself was tainted by Officer O'Gorman's unlawful search of
Mr. Bowman.
Thus, the continued detention was premised on the unlawful search, thereby
exploiting the illegality to allow the dog to sniff the car, and ultimately, to allow the
officers to search the car.

There was no independent investigation sufficiently

distinguishable from the one tainted by Officer O'Gorman's violation of the Fourth
Amendment that would purge the taint from the search of the car. Therefore, this Court
should exercise its review authority because of the Court of Appeals' improper analysis
on the poisonous fruit doctrine.

11.

The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Bowman's Motion To Suppress The Evidence
Found In The Car
A.

Introduction
On review, this Court should reverse the order partially denying Mr. Bowman's

motion to suppress because the officers' actions violated the protections against
unreasonable searches and seizures.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States

16

Constitution provides·

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated .... " U.S. CONST. amend. IV The Fourth Amendment is enforceable against
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655

(1961 ); State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 524 (1986). The Idaho Constitution provides
its own, similar protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. IDAHO CONST.
Art. I,§ 17; State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469,471 (2001).
A unanimous United States Supreme Court has held that warrantless searches
are per se unreasonable. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978). Therefore, a
warrantless search is presumed to violate the Fourth Amendment, unless the State
demonstrates that one of the exceptional, well-established, and well-delineated
exceptions to the warrant requirement is applicable.

Id. at 390-91; see also State v.

Holton, 132 Idaho 501, 503-04 (1999) (holding the same standard applies to Art. I, § 17

of the Idaho Constitution).
There are several reasons why the evidence found in Mr. Bowman's car should
have been suppressed in this case.

First, the officers unlawfully prolonged their

detention of Mr. Bowman to allow the dog sniff of the car, and that sniff led to the
discovery of the evidence in the car.

As the prolonged detention was unlawful, any

evidence found a.? a result of that prolonged detention should have been suppressed.
Second, since Sergeant Walbey had Bullet sniff Mr. Bowman's car because Officer
O'Gorman had found methamphetamine during an unlawful search of Mr. Bowman's
pocket, the canine sniff is not sufficiently attenuated as to constitute an independent
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investigation. Therefore, the evidence in the car should have been suppressed as fruit
poisonous tree.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision

on a motion to suppress is challenged, the Court accepts the trial court's findings of fact
that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of
constitutional principles to the facts as found."
(2004).

State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 843

However, where the district court's factual findings are not supported by

substantial and competent evidence, this Court should set those factual findings aside
as clearly erroneous. Lovitt v. Robideaux, 139 Idaho 322. 325 (2003).

C.

The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Bowman's Motion To Suppress The
Evidence In the Car, Since The Officers Unlawfully Prolonged The Detention Of
Mr. Bowman To Allow A Drug Dog To Sniff His Car
Traffic stops are limited in scope, and in that regard, are analogous to

investigative detentions. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 409 (2012). As such, they
are limited by the principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Danney, 153
Idaho at 409. Therefore, such detentions '·'must be temporary and last no longer than
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop."'

Id. (quoting State v. Henage, 143

Idaho 655, 658 (2007) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality
opinion))). Of course, the purpose of the stop can evolve if officers legitimately become
aware of facts or circumstances that create a reasonable suspicion which justifies
pursuing some other line of inquiry.

See. e.g., State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 562

(Ct. App. 2005).
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However, where officers do not legitimately become aware of such facts or
circumstances, any prolonged detention, even a momentary one, is unreasonable and
infringes on the seized person's constitutional rights. Royer, 460 U.S. at 498; Gutierrez,
137 Idaho at 652.

It is the State's burden to demonstrate that the seizure was

sufficiently limited in scope and duration
2009).

State v. Bordeaux, 148 Idaho 1, 6 (Ct. App.

Furthermore, if the officers seize evidence pursuant to an unreasonable

detention, that evidence is considered to be fruit of the poisonous tree, and therefore, is
not admissible. Id. at 8 (citing Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487).
The violation of Mr. Bowman's rights in this regard is clear. Officers pulled over
Mr. Bowman's car to investigate a report of domestic battery.

(See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1,

p.19, Ls.16-22.) Therefore, absent legitimately-discovered facts justifying an evolution
of the purpose of the stop, the detention of Mr. Bowman could only last as long as it was
necessary for officers to investigate and resolve the report of a domestic battery.

See Royer, 460 U.S. at 500; Danney, 153 Idaho at 409.
The officers' investigation into the reported domestic battery, and thus, the
purpose of the stop, was completed when the officers decided to place Ms. Phillips
under arrest for misdemeanor domestic battery. See Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615. As
the dog sniff did not begin until after the purpose of the stop was compete, absent
legitimately-discovered facts justifying the continued detention of Mr. Bowman at that
point, the dog sniff unlawfully prolonged his detention. The only evidence that might
have justified prolonging the detention was the baggie found in Mr. Bowman's pocket.
However, as that evidence was found during an unlawful search, it cannot be the
justification for prolonging the detention.

(See R., p.135 (suppressing the evidence
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found during Officer O'Gorman's unlawful search).) As such, there were no legitimatelydiscovered facts to justify continuing to detain Mr. Bowman after the officers completed
purpose of the stop. Therefore, the dog sniff unlawfully prolonged Mr. Bowman's
detention.
However, the district court determined that the stop was not unlawfully prolonged
based on its findings that Officer O'Gorman went back to talk with Mr. Bowman while
Sergeant Walbey deployed the drug dog, and that the purported conversation between
Officer O'Gorman and Mr. Bowman was necessary to complete the investigation of the
reported domestic battery. (R., p.133.) As a result, it concluded that the investigation
was still properly on-going while Bullet sniffed the car, and thus, the dog sniff did not
unlawfully prolong the detention. (R., p.133.)
The district court's conclusion is wrong on several levels. It includes two clearly
erroneous findings of fact and it also misapplies the relevant law. As such, the district
court's determination that the officers did not unlawfully extend Mr. Bowman's detention
to allow for the drug dog to sniff his car should be reversed

1.

The District Court's Factual Findings Regarding The Prolonging Of The
Stop Were Clearly Erroneous

The district court's factual finding that Officer O'Gorman was continuing to
investigate the domestic battery while Bullet sniffed Mr. Bowman's car is clearly
erroneous. Lovitt v. Robideaux, 139 Idaho 322, 325 (2003) (noting that, when a district
court's factual findings are not supported by substantial and competent evidence they
are clearly erroneous and should be set aside on appeal). In fact, if that determination
were correct, and that Officer O'Gorman was continuing the investigation during that
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follow up discussion, that would mean Officer O'Gorman's follow up violated the Fifth
Amendment, as Mr. Bowman had invoked his right to counsel at that point.
Specifically, the district court determined that "Officer O'Gorman was talking with
Mr. Bowman. Thus, there is evidence to suggest that the time used by the officers was
necessary to complete the investigation into the alleged domestic battery." (R., p.133.)
The officers' testimony reveals that the domestic violence investigation was completed
before the dog sniff began:
Q. [by defense counsel for Mr. Bowman]. When did you [Officer Domeny]
deem the investigation complete, exactly?

A. After I met with the other officers and got all sides of the story, we
talked to each other and decided what course of action to take.
(Tr., Vol.1, p.55, Ls.16-21.) Therefore, the investigation consisted of Officer Domeny
getting Mr. Bowman's account of the events, Officer O'Gorman getting Ms. Phillips' side
of the story, and Sergeant Walbey getting the reporting witness's statement. (Tr., Vol.1,
p.49, Ls.1-7; Tr., Vol.1, p.66, Ls.7-9; Tr., Vol.1, p.80, Ls.6-14.) Once they all finished
getting the various accounts, they gathered together to decide what course of action
they were going to take to resolve the investigation of the reported domestic battery.
(Tr., Vol.1, p.55, Ls.18-21.) That decision was to arrest Ms. Phillips for misdemeanor
domestic battery.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.66, Ls.15-24.) At that point, Ms. Phillips was placed

under "formal arrest." 11 (Tr., Vol.1, p.66, Ls. 22-24.) Therefore, the investigation was
complete upon the arrest of Ms. Phillips.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.55, Ls.16-21.) Since the dog

sniff did not begin until after they made the decision to arrest Ms. Phillips (see, e.g.,
Tr., Vol.1, p.81, Ls.16-23), the district court's conclusion that the investigation continued

That was actually easily accomplished, as Ms. Phillips was already in handcuffs in the
back of a patrol car at that point in time. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.64, Ls.11-13.)
11
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while Sergeant Walbey deployed the drug dog was clearly erroneous and should be set
aside by this Court.
Similarly, the district court's finding that Officer Gorman went back to ask
Mr. Bowman questions while Bullet sniffed the car is clearly erroneous.

That

determination was based solely on Sergeant Walbey's statement that, at the time the
dog sniff was occurring, "I think Officer O'Gorman was back talking with Mr. Bowman at
that time." (Tr., Vol.1, p.87, Ls.12-14.) However, that is not substantial or competent
evidence. The fact that Sergeant Walbey testified "/ think Officer O'Gorman was back
talking ... " while the sergeant was getting Bullet out of his car demonstrates that he
was not certain what Officer O'Gorman was doing.
This is particularly obvious in light of Officer Domeny's affirmative assertions to
the contrary. Officer Domeny was certain that the officers did not talk to Mr. Bowman
while the dog sniff was occurring for one simple reason: "[Mr. Bowman] said he wanted
to speak with a lawyer." (Tr., Vol.1, p.54, Ls.10-25.) At that point, "[w]e were done
talking with him .... No other questions were asked of him." (Tr., Vol. 1, p.54, Ls.20, 25
(emphasis added).)

As Mr. Bowman was placed under arrest before the dog sniff

began (see, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.27, Ls.1-9), there was not substantial and competent
evidence to support the district court's finding that Officer O'Gorman was, in fact, talking
with Mr. Bowman during the dog sniff.

As such, that finding should be rejected as

clearly erroneous.
And even if Officer O'Gorman was talking with Mr. Bowman, there is absolutely
no evidence that the purported conversation was relevant to the investigation of the
reported domestic battery. (See generally Tr., Vol.1, p.87, Ls.12-14 (Sergeant Walbey
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indicating only that a conversation occurred, not what the conversation was about).) 12
Therefore, even if Officer Gorman was talking to Mr. Bowman, there is no evidence,
much less substantial and competent evidence, to support the district court's conclusion
that the investigation into the domestic battery was continuing while the dog sniff was
proceeding.
However, if the district court's findings that Officer O'Gorman had to talk with
Mr. Bowman to complete the investigation of the domestic battery during the dog sniff
are accurate, then those factual findings demonstrate that Officer O'Gorman violated
Mr. Bowman's Fifth Amendment right to counsel by continuing to interrogate him after
an unequivocal invocation of his right to counsel. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,
485 (1981 ); State v. Salato, 137 Idaho 260, 267 (Ct. App. 2001 ).

In that case, the

district court still could not find that Officer O'Gorman's actions justified prolonging the
stop. See, e.g., Royer, 460 U.S. at 498; Guiterrez, 137 Idaho at 652

As the federal

district court of Vermont aptly summarized, "law enforcement cannot prolong a roadside
detention in order to conduct an interrogation in violation of Miranda, and then use the
evidence gleaned from the Miranda violation to justify the prolonged detention .... [T]he
[subsequent] canine sniff was the product of an unlawful detention under the Fourth
Amendment."

United States v. Ramos, No.1:11-cr-111, 2012 WL 2370204, *1

(D. Vermont June 22, 2012).
In similar decisions, the Idaho Court of Appeals has indicated a Miranda violation
is a factor which indicates that the police action is not reasonable in the totality of the

As no other evidence mentions this conversation at all (see generally Tr., Vol.1, p.62,
L.8 - p. 78, L.4 (Officer O'Gorman's testimony); Exhibit 1), there is no evidence in the
record to indicate what that purported conversation was about.
12
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circumstances, and so, indicates that the police action violates the Fourth Amendment.
e.g., Woodward v. State, 142 Idaho 98, 107 (Ct App. 2005); State v. Myers, 118
Idaho 608, 612 (Ct. App. 1990). In this case, that means Officer O'Gorman's violation
of Mr. Bowman's Miranda rights would make the prolonged detention to reinitiate
contact with Mr. Bowman unreasonable. As a result, it would not justify the prolonged
detention, and therefore, the dog sniff still occurred during an unlawfully prolonged stop.
Because the district court's conclusion - that the officers did not unlawfully
prolong the stop to allow for the dog sniff - was based on clearly erroneous findings of
fact, its decision based on that conclusion should be reversed.

2.

The District Court's Legal Conclusions Regarding Whether The Officers
Unlawfully Prolonged The Detention Of Mr. Bowman Were Contradictory
To Precedent

The district court's conclusion that Officer O'Gorman could, after the officers had
gathered all the information necessary to address the purpose of the stop, reasonably
delay releasing Mr. Bowman by asking him additional, unnecessary questions, such that
the drug dog sniff of the car did not delay the detention, is an inappropriate legal
conclusion. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614 (holding that any seizure lasting
beyond the time in which the purpose of the stop should reasonably have been resolved
violates the Fourth Amendment). The law in this regard is clear: it is unreasonable for
officers to stall or draw out their investigative efforts in order to allow a drug dog to
arrive and sniff the vehicle. Id. For example:
In [State v. Zavala, 134 Idaho 532 (Ct. App. 2000)], the police officer
purposefully detained the defendant for an unreasonable period to allow
time for a drug canine unit to arrive. In the present case, [the defendant]
was not detained except for six minutes during which the officer obtained
and held his vehicle registration for a routine records check, and the thirty-
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minute delay between the time of first contact with [the defendant] to the
time the officers walked [the dog] around the car was not a stalling tactic
to allow time for the dog to arrive.
State v. Martinez, 136 Idaho 436, 442 n.2 (Ct App. 2001) (emphasis added). The Court
of Appeals has also found that, where the evidence does not indicate that the officer is
purposefully delaying resolving the investigation to facilitate a dog sniff, the time it
reasonably takes the officer to resolve the investigation does not violate the defendant's
rights. State v. Ramirez, 145 Idaho 886, 890 (Ct. App. 2008).
Contrarily, the district court's decision in this case would allow an officer to delay
resolving the investigation, despite having all the information necessary to do so, by
asking nonessential, even unrelated, additional questions of the defendant in an effort to
buy time for a dog sniff to occur. (See R , p.133.) Therefore, besides being factually
erroneous, the district court's determination that the detention of Mr. Bowman was
lawfully prolonged is legally erroneous and should be rejected by this Court.

The

officers had all the information they needed to resolve the investigation of the reported
domestic battery. Therefore, any stalling or purposeful delaying by Officer O'Gorman
after that point was unreasonable and violated Mr. Bowman's rights.
As discussed in depth in Section l(A), infra, the United States Supreme Court
recently reaffirmed this principle. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614-1616. This principle
makes sense because, were an opposite view taken, "a crafty officer, knowing this rule,
may simply delay writing [and explaining] a ticket for the initial traffic violation until after
she has satisfied herself that all her hunches were unfounded." United States v. Stepp,
680 F.3d 651, 662 (6th Cir. 2012). As the Sixth Circuit held, these sorts of delays are
unreasonable extensions of the not-yet-completed traffic stops, and they constitute
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seizures. Id. Thus, the use of a drug dog in such a situation would be unlawful. See id.
That conclusion leads naturally to the Rodriguez Court's determination that completion
of the investigation is the critical point, not delivery and explanation of the ticket.

See Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616.
In this case, the purpose of the stop was to investigate the reported domestic
battery. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.19, Ls.16-22 (Officer Domeny explaining the reason he
was dispatched).)

Officer Domeny testified that the officers had completed the

investigation of that reported domestic battery when "I met with the other officers and
got all sides of the story, we talked to each other and decided what course of action to
take." (Tr., Vol 1, p.55, Ls 16-21.) At that point, the officers no longer had a reasonable
suspicion to continue to detain Mr. Bowman based on the initial stop since the
investigation of the purpose of that stop was complete. 13 (Tr., Vol.1, p.55, L.25 - p.56,
L.4.)

Since Sergeant Walbey deployed Bullet after that point, (see Tr., Vol.1, p.81,

Ls.16-19), the sniff did not occur while the officers were reasonably detaining
Mr. Bowman pursuant to their investigation of the purpose of the stop.

As a result,

unless there was some other legitimate justification for the continuing detention of
Mr. Bowman, deploying Bullet unlawfully prolonged the duration of that detention.

See Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614.

Mr. Bowman was not reasonably detained at that point based on the evidence found
in his pocket because that evidence was found during an illegal search (see Section
ll(D), infra).

13
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3.

The Purpose Of The Stop Did Not Legitimately Evolve Beyond The
Domestic Battery Investigation

The only potential justification for continuing to detain Mr. Bowman beyond the
conclusion of the investigation into the report of domestic battery was that the officers
had found the baggie of methamphetamine in his pocket. (See generally R., Tr.)

In

fact, as Officer O'Gorman admitted, prior to finding that baggie, they had no information
suggesting potential drug activity.

(See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.73, L. 20 - p.74, L. 1.)

Therefore, without the baggie, there was no justification for an expansion of the scope
of the detention to investigate potential drug activity.
As the district court correctly determined, the State had not proved that the
consent exception, the stop-and-frisk exception, the exigent circumstances exception,
or any other exception to the warrant requirement applied to Officer O'Gorman's
warrantless search of Mr. Bowman's pocket.

(R., pp.128-31.)

As such, it properly

found that the officers unlawfully searched Mr. Bowman's pocket when they found that
baggie. (R., pp.128-31.) Therefore, the baggie was not legitimately discovered, and so,
cannot serve as the basis to continue warrantlessly detaining Mr. Bowman. See Wong

Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487 (1963); State v. Bordeaux, 148 Idaho 1, 6
(Ct. App. 2009).

Holding otherwise would allow the officers to exploit the unlawful

search and use the evidence found therein to the unlawfully-searched person's
disadvantage, and that would violate the unlawfully-searched person's constitutional
rights a second time. Cf. State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 846-47 (2004) (explaining why
officers had not exploited the unlawful search in that case, as well as explaining how
they easily could have, in which case, the evidence found would have been
inadmissible).
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Since the baggie unlawfully found in Mr. Bowman's pocket cannot be the basis
an expansion of the scope of the stop, the officers had no reasonable basis to
continue detaining Mr. Bowman after they completed their investigation of the purpose
of the stop (the report of domestic battery). Therefore, continuing to detain Mr. Bowman
so that Bullet could sniff the car impermissibly extended the detention. That constitutes
a violation of Mr. Bowman's constitutional rights.

Bordeaux, 148 Idaho at 6 (citing

Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409-10 (2005)); Aguirre, 141 Idaho at 563 (explaining

that, in Caballes, the United States Supreme Court was careful to note that the drug dog
sniff was permissible because the use of the dog in that case did not lengthen the
duration of the stop); cf Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct at 1614-16 Therefore, the district court's
order denying Mr. Bowman's motion to suppress the evidence found in the car should
be reversed.

D.

The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Bowman's Motion To Suppress, Since
The Evidence Found In Mr. Bowman's Car Was Fruit Of Officer O'Gorman's
Unlawful Search Of Mr. Bowman's Pocket
As previously noted, when the officers unlawfully search a person, the evidence

seized as a result of that unlawful search must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous
tree. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484. This includes both the direct and indirect products of
that unlawful search. Id. "To determine whether to suppress evidence as 'fruit of the
poisonous tree,' the court must inquire whether the evidence has been recovered as a
result of the exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable
to be purged of the taint." Page, 140 Idaho at 846.
The defendant's initial burden is to establish a factual nexus between the
unlawful search and the evidence in question. State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 184
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(Ct. App. 2005).

In fact, Officer Domeny's testimony highlights the factual nexus

between the unlawful search and the evidence in question in this case. The officers
decided to have Bullet sniff Mr. Bowman's car precisely because Officer O'Gorman
found methamphetamine during his (unlawful) search of Mr. Bowman's pocket.
(Tr., Vol.1, p.81, Ls.19-23.)

The officers subsequently searched Mr. Bowman's car

based on the dog's alert. (See R., p.127.) Therefore, the officers' testimony establishes
the factual nexus tying the evidence in the car to the unlawful search.
Once the defendant has established the factual nexus, the State bears the
burden of proving that the evidence in question has not been tainted by the unlawful
search. State v. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245, 250 (1990). The district court applied a
"but for" analysis to determine whether the evidence in the car should be suppressed as
fruit of Officer O'Gorman's unlawful search. (R., p.132.) Specifically, it determined that
the unlawful search was not the "but for" cause of the discovery of the evidence in the
car; rather, it found the drug dog's alert superseded the unlawful search as the "but for"
cause of the search of the car. (R., p.132.) This is not the correct analysis under the
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine: "whether subsequent evidence constitutes 'fruit of
the poisonous tree' is more than just a 'but for' test." See, e.g., State v. Radford, 134
Idaho 187, 193 (2000). As the United States Supreme Court has explained:
We need not hold that all evidence is "fruit of the poisonous tree" simply
because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the
police. Rather, the more apt question in such a case is "whether, granting
establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant
objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or
instead by some means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the
primary taint."
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Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88.

Thus, the appropriate question is not whether the

officers would have obtained the evidence "but for" their knowledge of the baggie, but
rather, whether the dog sniff, which led to the search of the car, was sufficiently
separated from the taint of the unlawful search of Mr. Bowman's pocket.

See id.;

Radford, 134 Idaho at 193.
To properly determine whether the unlawful search is sufficiently separated from
the evidence in question, the courts consider three factors:

(1) the time elapsed

between the misconduct and the acquisition of the evidence; (2) the occurrence of
intervening circumstances; and (3) the flagrancy and purpose of the improper law
enforcement action.

Page, 140 Idaho at 846 (adopting this analysis from United

States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515, 521 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422
U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975))).

Based on the facts of this case, all three of these factors

demonstrate that the taint from Officer O'Gorman's unlawful search extends to the
evidence found in Mr. Bowman's car.

1.

The Minimal Temporal Separation Between The Unlawful Search And The
Evidence Found In The Car Indicates That The Taint Affects The
Evidence Found In The Car

In this case, almost no time elapsed between the unlawful search and the
discovery of the evidence in the car. (R., p.127 (district court finding that the total time
from Mr. Bowman pulling over to Bullet sniffing the car was between five and ten
minutes).) Thus, this factor suggests that the taint from Officer O'Gorman's unlawful
search projects onto the evidence found in the car. Green, 111 F.3d at 521.
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2.

There Were No Intervening Circumstances Sufficient To Separate The
Evidence Found In The Car From The Taint Of The Unlawful Search

It is true that, between the two searches, Bullet sniffed and alerted on
Mr. Bowman's car. However, simply because the drug dog sniff occurred between the
unlawful search and the discovery of the evidence in question does not mean that the
drug dog sniff is a sufficient intervening circumstance to attenuate the taint of the
unlawful search from the evidence in question.

See, e.g., Green, 111 F.3d at 521

(explaining that a determination on one of the three factors is not dispositive).

To

determine whether an intervening circumstance shows sufficient attenuation between
the unlawful search and the evidence in question, Idaho employs three related lines of
analysis: the independent source doctrine, the inevitable discovery doctrine, and the
attenuated basis exception. Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 495-99 (2001) (adopting
and explaining these three exceptions to the exclusionary rule).
those

analyses

show sufficient separation

subsequently-discovered evidence.

between

the

However, none of

unlawful

search

and

Thus, the subsequently-discovered evidence

remains fruit of the poisonous tree.

a.

The Independent Source Doctrine Is Inapplicable In This Case

The independent source doctrine provides that, if the evidence is uncovered by a
wholly separate line of investigation than the one tainted by the unlawful search, the
evidence is still admissible.

Id. at 496-97.

Here, Sergeant Walbey, Officer Oomeny,

and Officer O'Gorman were all part of the same investigation, as they were working in
concert to collect all the different accounts from witnesses and parties. Furthermore,
Officers O'Gorman and

Oomeny asked Sergeant Walbey to have Bullet sniff
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Mr. Bowman's car because they had found methamphetamine during the course of that
investigation. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.81, Ls.16-23.) Thus, Bullet's sniff is inexorably
tied to the discovery of the baggie in Mr. Bowman's pocket; it definitely was not an
independent investigation. 14
In fact, as Officer O'Gorman admitted, the officers possessed no information that
would cause them to suspect drug activity absent the baggie they found

in

Mr. Bowman's pocket (Tr., Vol.1, p.73, L.20 - p.74, L.1.) Therefore, it cannot be said
with any degree of certainty that, without finding that baggie during the illegal search,
Bullet would have been deployed at all

Therefore, Bullet's sniff cannot be deemed an

independent source. Because Sergeant Walbey and Bullet were not part of a wholly

different line of investigation, the independent source doctrine does not apply in this
case.

b.

The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine Is Inapplicable In This Case

The inevitable discovery doctrine is "in reality an extrapolation from the
independent source doctrine: Since the tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact
discovered through an independent source, it should be admissible if it inevitably would
have been discovered." Stuart, 136 Idaho at 497-98 (quoting Murray v. United States,
487 U.S. 533, 539 (1988)) (emphasis from Murray). Therefore, that analysis presumes

Sergeant Walbey might have engaged in a fully independent investigation, had he
immediately deployed Bullet upon arriving on the scene rather than assisting Officers
Domeny and O'Gorman by interviewing Mr. Casey. Compare Page, 140 Idaho at
846-47 (explaining that, in a similar set of circumstances, the order in which information
is uncovered by officers is critical to the determination of whether or not the evidence
has to be suppressed). However, as Sergeant Walbey did not pursue his own
investigation, but rather, joined in the ongoing investigation, which was tainted by
Officer O'Gorman's unlawful search, the independent source doctrine does not apply in
this case.
14
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that there was an independent source investigation that would have, through its own
devices, ultimately uncovered the evidence, regardless of the violation of the
defendant's rights. See id. However, as discussed in Section ll(D)(2)(a), supra, there
was no separate line of investigation which could have inevitably discovered the
evidence in the car. Thus, the inevitable discovery doctrine does not apply in this case
either.

c.

The Attenuation Basis Exception Is Not Applicable In This Case

The attenuation basis exception allows the State to present otherwise-tainted
evidence if that evidence is accessed through independent, non-official sources that are
in no way related to the unlawful search (such as through the testimony of wholly
independent lay witnesses). 15

Stuart, 136 Idaho at 498 (discussing the opinion in

United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 276-77 (1978)). However, in Mr. Bowman's

case, the tainted evidence found in the car was not accessed through some wholly
unrelated non-government witness who was identified by officers working outside the
tainted investigation. (See generally R.) Rather, it was being accessed through one of
the officers who was actually involved in the investigation that was tainted by the
unlawful search. Therefore, the attenuated basis exception is also not applicable in this
case.
Since none of the Stuart exceptions apply in this case, Bullet's sniff of the car
was not a sufficient intervening circumstance to attenuate the evidence found in the car

This is different than the independent source doctrine because the independent
source doctrine focuses on other lines of official investigation. See id.
15
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from the taint of Officer O'Gorman's unlawful search of Mr. Bowman. Therefore, the
taint from Officer O'Gorman's unlawful search extends to the evidence found in the car.

3.

The Flagrancy Of The Officer's Misconduct And Lack Of Reasonable
Purpose For The Unlawful Search Demonstrates That The Taint From The
Unlawful Search Extends To The Evidence Found In The Car

The final factor in the Page/Green analysis is an evaluation of the flagrancy and
purpose of the improper law enforcement action. Page, 140 Idaho at 846; Green, 111
F.3d at 521. As Office O'Gorman's unlawful search contained several flagrant violations
of Mr. Bowman's constitutional rights and served no reasonable purpose in the
investigation, this factor further demonstrates his unlawful search tainted the evidence
subsequently discovered during that investigation.
For example, Officer O'Gorman warrantlessly searched Mr. Bowman's person
without asking for Mr. Bowman's consent when he purportedly saw Mr. Bowman trying
to reach into his pocket.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.76, Ls.9-11.) When Officer O'Gorman asked

Mr. Bowman what he was purportedly trying to get from his pocket, Mr. Bowman told
him he was trying to get a cigarette.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.69, Ls.5-7.)

Officer O'Gorman

testified that he was concerned Mr. Bowman was trying to get a weapon. (Tr., Vol.1,
p.69, Ls.11-15.) However, that is not a reasonable purpose, given the facts of this case.
The most important fact in that regard is that Officer Domeny had already

performed a pat down search for weapons on Mr. Bowman and found none. (Tr., Vol.1,
p.49, L.22 - p.50, L.5.) Furthermore, Mr. Bowman had been cooperative throughout the
investigation, and there was no evidence that he was intoxicated or otherwise
threatening; in fact, he was still handcuffed. (Tr., Vol.1, p.43, Ls.22-24; Tr., Vol.1, p.49,
L.16 - p.50, L.25.)

Therefore, Officer O'Gorman performed an unlawful second pat
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down search (focused on Mr. Bowman's pocket) without reasonable suspicion that
Mr. Bowman was either armed or presently dangerous. See, e.g., State v. Bishop, 146
Idaho 804 (2009) (discussing what facts need to be present for an officer to have a
reasonable fear for his safety).
Furthermore, when Officer O'Gorman performed his pat down search of
Mr. Bowman's pocket, he felt an object consistent with a pack of cigarettes, and he did
not feel anything he thought might be a weapon. (Tr., Vol.1, p.76, Ls.3-5.) And yet,
despite having confirmed that there was nothing in the pocket giving him a reasonable
basis to fear for his safety, particularly since Mr. Bowman remained handcuffed
throughout this encounter, 16 Officer O'Gorman still decided to warrantlessly invade
Mr. Bowman's privacy by reaching into the pocket. Compare State v. Faith, 141 Idaho
728, 731 (Ct. App. 2005) (explaining why officers are not allowed to manipulate objects
beyond what is necessary to determine they do not pose a threat).
The flagrancy of this violation is also enhanced by the fact that this occurred
during the one portion of the stop that Officer Domeny had turned off his dashboard
camera. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.24, L.23 - p.25, L.13.) The dashboard camera is designed to
help prevent violations of a person's rights during a traffic stop, and yet, the officers
decided to turn it off. As Ms. Phillips' attorney pointed out below, there was no reason
for that camera to be turned off unless the officers wanted to prevent the courts from

The fact that Mr. Bowman remained handcuffed also demonstrates that it was unlikely
that he would be able to destroy any then-unidentified evidence that might have been in
his pocket. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.75, Ls.23-25 (Officer O'Gorman expressing his
disbelief that Mr. Bowman would be able to perform tasks effectively (such as
extracting, lighting, and smoking a cigarette) with his hands restrained as they were).)
Hence, the district court's determination that the State failed to prove the exigency
exception. (R., p.131 (the district court reaching that same conclusion).) Therefore,
exigency is not a proper justification for Officer O'Gorman's search either.
16
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seeing what they were about to do, which in this case, was violate Mr. Bowman's
constitutional rights.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.107,

15-21.)

Thus, the flagrant nature of the

unlawful search coupled with the lack of a reasonable purpose means the taint is more
likely to extend to indirect fruits of that search.
The conclusion that the flagrancy of the officers' conduct indicates that the taint
extends to the evidence in the car is reinforced by the fact that the district court made a
clearly erroneous factual finding that Mr. Bowman consented to Officer Domeny's initial
pat down search of his person.

(R., p.126.)

The video of that portion of the stop

demonstrates that, after Mr. Bowman was placed in handcuffs and he told Officer
Domeny that he did not have any weapons on him, Officer Domeny asked, "Mind if I
check?"

(Exhibit 1, Video 1, approximately 2:29.)

The only audible response

Mr. Bowman gave was, "Yeah." (Exhibit 1, Video 1, approximately 2:29.) Mr. Bowman
submitted an affidavit averring that he did not consent to Officer Domeny's pat down
search (i.e., "yeah, I do mind if you check"). (R., p.106.) Officer Domeny' testimony,
that Mr. Bowman told him "[G]o ahead," was not consistent with the video. (Tr., Vol.1,
p.48, L.8.) Therefore, there is not substantial and competent evidence that Mr. Bowman
consented to that search (much less that he voluntarily did so (a point on which there
was no discussion by the district court (see generally R., pp.124-35))

As the State

bears the burden of proof when it comes to exceptions to the warrant requirement, the
fact that there is not substantial evidence should weigh against finding that the
exception exists in this case.

See Mincey, 437 U.S. at 390-91; Holton, 132 Idaho at

503-04. Therefore, the district court's conclusion that Mr. Bowman gave his consent for
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that search was also clearly erroneous and should be set aside. See Lovitt, 139 Idaho
at 325.
Officer Domeny's pat down search of Mr. Bowman was also conducted without
the requisite reasonable suspicion that Mr. Bowman was armed and presently
dangerous. See, e.g., Bishop, 146 Idaho at 818; Henage, 143 Idaho at 660. As such,
Officer Domeny's pat down search was also unlawful, meaning Mr. Bowman was
subjected to two unlawful searches before the evidence in his car was discovered, and
that only reinforces the conclusion that the taint of the unlawful searches extends to the
evidence found in the car.
Therefore, considering all three of the Page/Green factors, the taint from Officer
O'Gorman's unlawful search extends to the evidence found in the car, despite Bullet's
alert on the car. This is consistent with the purposes of the exclusionary rule, one of
which is to protect against police misconduct.

State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 519

(2012) (recognizing and reaffirming the multiple justifications for the exclusionary rule).
And yet, the district court's decision to not suppress the evidence found in the car as
fruit of Officer O'Gorman's unlawful search actually rewards the officers for their
unlawful conduct. By their own admission, they had no other reason to suspect drug
activity, except the direct fruit of their unlawful search.
L.1.)

(Tr., Vol.1, p.73, L.20 - p.74,

Nevertheless, their arrest of Mr. Bowman is allowed to stand despite their

misconduct. Thus, in this case, the exclusionary rule should have been extended to the
evidence found in the car.

Therefore, this Court should reverse the district court's

decision denying Mr. Bowman's motion to suppress the evidence found in the car.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Bowman respectfully requests this Court grant his Petition for Review on this
case. On review, he respectfully requests respectfully requests that this Court reverse
the order denying his motion to suppress the evidence found in the car and remand this
case for further proceedings.
DATED this 21S1 day of October, 2015.

BRIAN R DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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